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GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The National Labor Relations Board (Board) applies to 
this Court to enforce, and St. George Warehouse, Inc., (St. 
George) cross-petitions this Court to review, an order 
awarding backpay to two former St. George employees who 
were terminated for unlawfully discriminatory reasons.  St. 
George argues that General Counsel for the Board did not 
meet its burden of producing evidence as to the 
reasonableness of  the discriminatees‟ post-termination efforts 
to seek employment.  Because we conclude that there was 
substantial evidence to support the Board‟s findings 
concerning mitigation, we will enforce the Board‟s order 
awarding backpay and deny the cross-petition for review. 
 
I. 
 
 In March 1999, St. George discharged forklift-operator 
Leonard Sides and warehouseman Jesus “Jesse” Tharp.  Sides 
and Tharp appealed their respective discharges to an ALJ.  
The ALJ ordered St. George to reinstate Sides and Tharp and 
make them whole  for their losses, concluding that they had 
been subject to surveillance and discharged discriminatorily 
by St. George on account of their involvement in a union.  In 
a June 23, 2000, decision and order, the Board affirmed the 
ALJ‟s findings and conclusions, and adopted the ALJ‟s order 
as modified.  331 N.L.R.B. 454 (2000).  We thereupon 
enforced the Board‟s order on April 23, 2001.  261 F.3d 493 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Our judgment was later amended on June 5, 
2001.   
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 Sides and Tharp were offered  reinstatement on 
September 1, 2000, but both declined.  As a consequence, 
each was entitled to receive backpay from the date of his 
discharge (March 31, 1999, for Sides; March 16, 1999, for 
Tharp) until September 1, 2000.  St. George calculated the 
backpay it owed for that period as $6,618.40 to Sides and 
$8,302.02 to Tharp, and paid each accordingly.  
 
 On May 28, 2002, the Regional Director of the Board 
issued a Compliance Specification and Notice of Hearing,
1
 
which estimated additional amounts of backpay due to Sides 
and Tharp.  At the subsequent compliance (backpay) hearing 
on October 8, 2002, neither Tharp nor Sides testified, and 
General Counsel,
2
 who represented the discriminatees, did not 
                                              
 
1
  The Regional Director is the Board agent responsible 
for issuing “a compliance specification in the name of the 
Board” 1) when “it appears that controversy exists with 
respect to compliance with an order of the Board which 
cannot be resolved without a formal proceeding,” or  2) 
“[w]henever the Regional Director deems it necessary in 
order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the [NLRA] 
or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.54(a) 
& (b).  “With respect to allegations concerning the amount of 
backpay due,” the compliance specification must “specifically 
and in detail show, for each employee, the backpay periods 
broken down by calendar quarters, the specific figures and 
basis of computation of gross backpay and interim earnings, 
the expenses for each quarter, the net backpay due, and any 
other pertinent information.”  Id. § 102.55(a). 
 
 
2
  The General Counsel of the Board “exercise[s] 
general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board 
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call any witnesses.  St. George called a vocational expert, 
Donna Flannery, to testify that neither Sides nor Tharp had 
adequately sought to mitigate damages by exercising 
reasonable diligence in seeking interim employment.  
Flannery asserted that, based on employment statistics and 
newspaper advertisements, there were a substantial number of 
comparable jobs available to Tharp and Sides during their 
respective backpay periods.  However, she admitted that she 
had not interviewed either of them.   
 
 In an October 30, 2002, Supplemental Decision, the 
ALJ noted in her analysis that the burden of establishing that 
Sides and Tharp had failed to mitigate their damages rested 
exclusively with St. George, and did not shift back to General 
Counsel at any point.  The ALJ found that St. George did not 
meet its burden of proving that Sides and Tharp had failed to 
exercise diligence in finding new work.  As a consequence, 
the ALJ recommended that each be given additional backpay 
in the amounts of $26,447.90 to Sides and $14,649.79  to 
Tharp. 
 
 Nearly five years later, on September 30, 2007, the 
Board issued a Supplemental Decision and Order remanding 
                                                                                                     
. . . and over the officers and employees in the regional 
offices,” as well as “final authority, on behalf of the Board, in 
respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of 
complaints under [29 U.S.C. § 160], and in respect of the 
prosecution of such complaints before the Board.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 153(d).  In investigating and prosecuting unfair-labor 
complaints, the General Counsel acts independently of the 
Board.  See NLRB v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 613 F.3d 
275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2010).    
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this matter to the ALJ.  The Board articulated a new standard 
of proof for backpay hearings: while employers would 
continue to bear the burden of persuasion as to an employee‟s 
alleged failure to engage in a reasonable search for new work, 
as well as the burden of producing evidence that there were 
substantially equivalent jobs within the relevant geographic 
area, General Counsel and the employee would now have the 
burden of producing evidence that the employee took 
reasonable steps to pursue those jobs.  351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 
(2007).  In applying that new burden-shifting framework to 
the facts of this case, the Board concluded that St. George had 
produced evidence of substantially equivalent jobs within the 
area, but that General Counsel had not met its burden of 
production as to the employees‟ reasonable diligence to 
mitigate.  As a result, the Board remanded to the ALJ to 
reopen the record to allow the parties to present evidence 
consistent with the revised burden of production, as declared 
by the Board.  
 
A. 
 
 Remand hearings were held before a new ALJ on 
February 26 and March 14, 2008.  With respect to Sides‟s 
claim for backpay, General Counsel called Sides and 
Salvatore LoSauro, supervisor for the records unit at the New 
Jersey Department of Labor Employment Service (NJDOL) 
Employment Service, as witnesses.  Sides testified that after 
being discharged from St. George, where he had worked for 
one-and-a-half years, he went to a New Jersey unemployment 
office and filed for benefits on April 18, 1999.  On April 29, 
1999, Sides registered at the veterans unit of the NJDOL 
Employment Service for help in returning to the workforce.  
On May 7, 1999, Sides was found eligible for unemployment 
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benefits, and received his first unemployment check on June 
1, 1999. 
 
 Sides also testified that between March 1999 and 
October 2000, he reviewed job listings in newspapers, 
primarily the Sunday Star Ledger.  Sides did not own a car, 
and thus, his job search was restricted to positions within 
twenty-five miles of his home and within walking distance 
(about a mile) of public transportation.  He also inquired 
about potential openings through friends and associates.    
 
 Sides found temporary work at two temporary staffing 
agencies, Labor Ready and J & J Staffing Resources, Inc.  At 
Labor Ready, Sides stocked shelves from October 25, 1999 to 
November 26, 1999.  At J & J, Sides unloaded tractor-trailers 
three to five days a week from November or December 1999 
until March 12, 2000.  Even as he worked in his temporary 
position at J & J, Sides continued to seek out long-term 
employment. 
 
 Sides kept records documenting his work search, 
which were admitted into evidence.  Those records indicate 
that from March 1999 through August 2000, Sides applied to 
at least thirty-three positions (including Labor Ready and J & 
J), eight of which (from May 3 to September 30, 1999) were 
referred to him by the Unemployment Office.  He also took a 
one-day forklift-certification class at the NJDOL in 
September 2009, and that he called a number of other 
employers to determine whether their businesses were located 
in an accessible area, but did not make a list of those 
employers because he had not been instructed to do so.   
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 On the other hand, St. George produced evidence that 
on October 3, 2002,  it had written to sixteen of the employers 
listed by Sides in order to verify his records.  While most 
employers did not respond, or replied that they did not keep 
such information on file, four responded that they specifically 
did not have an application from Sides on file, and one 
confirmed that Sides had applied.  In addition, General 
Counsel produced employers‟ verifications of four other 
applications that Sides had submitted.   
 
 LoSauro testified that he first spoke with Sides on 
April 29, 2009, when Sides was interviewed by the NJDOL 
about his experience and qualifications, and NJDOL gave 
Sides an assessment of his employment prospects.  LoSauro 
characterized Sides as “a very active job searcher,” and 
testified that NJDOL had given Sides eight job referrals 
between May and September 2009.  LoSauro also explained 
that verifications of applications are difficult to produce 
because few employers complete Job Bank Employer 
Reference forms, and those which are returned to the NJDOL 
are destroyed soon after.  
 
B. 
 
 With respect to Tharp‟s claim for backpay, General 
Counsel called Gail Moskus, Tharp‟s mother, as well as 
Collette Sarro, a regional compliance officer with the Board.  
Tharp had died before the proceeding began, and thus, was 
unavailable to testify.   
 
 According to the documentation that General Counsel 
entered into evidence, Tharp was discharged by St. George on 
March 16, 1999, after working there for approximately six 
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years. He applied for unemployment benefits the following 
day.  On his application for benefits, he certified that he was 
“ready, willing, and able to work full time” and would be able 
to begin work “at once.”  He received benefits from May 1, 
1999, until June 26, 1999.  Most records of Tharp‟s job 
search were unavailable, but on a Board backpay-claim 
questionnaire Tharp had completed in June 1999, he listed 
seven employers to whom he had applied unsuccessfully 
between June 24 and June 28, 1999. 
 
 After Tharp was discharged, he spoke with Moskus on 
the phone twice a month.  Based on those conversions, 
Moskus testified that Tharp had looked for work “every day” 
in New Jersey for about four months, but he became “very 
discouraged because he couldn‟t find work.”  Then, in mid-
September 1999, Tharp moved to Naples, Florida.  Collette 
Sarro‟s testimony confirmed that prior to moving to Florida, 
Tharp called her to tell her that he was relocating because “he 
couldn‟t find a job and couldn‟t afford to pay his rent.” 
 
 Moskus also testified that about two weeks after Tharp 
arrived in Florida, he began looking for forklift-driver and 
warehouse positions in the area.  He searched for jobs by 
making phone inquiries, scanning newspaper listings, and 
having Moskus drive him to businesses to fill out 
applications.  (Tharp did not own a car in New Jersey or 
Florida.)  From September to October 1999, Tharp applied for 
jobs with at least three Florida employers.  On October 19, 
1999, he accepted a job offer to work as a yardman and 
forklift operator for Naples Lumber, which, among the jobs 
he applied for, was the closest in salary and description to his 
position with St. George.  Tharp held that position with 
Naples Lumber through September 1, 2000.   
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C. 
 
 In a Second Supplemental Decision dated May 20, 
2008, the ALJ credited Sides‟s and Moskus‟s testimonies and 
determined that, based on the evidenced introduced by 
General Counsel, both Sides and Tharp had made diligent, 
reasonable efforts to find new work.  Accordingly, the ALJ 
recommended an order awarding them the backpay amounts 
ordered by the first ALJ in the October 30, 2002, 
Supplemental Decision -- i.e., $26,447.90 for Sides and 
$14,646.79 for Tharp (now Tharp‟s estate).  A two-member 
quorum of the Board affirmed the ALJ‟s rulings, findings, 
and conclusions, and adopted the recommended order.  353 
N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2008). 
 
 St. George petitioned this Court to review the Board‟s 
order, and General Counsel cross-petitioned for enforcement.  
While the petitions were pending, the Supreme Court decided 
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, holding that section 3(b) of 
the NLRA “requires that a delegee group maintain a 
membership of three in order to exercise the delegated 
authority of the Board.”  130 S.Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010).  Since 
the Board‟s order in this case had been entered by a two-
member panel, we vacated the Board‟s order in light of New 
Process Steel and remanded to the Board for further 
proceedings.  394 F.App‟x 902, 903 (3d Cir. 2010).  We also 
dismissed General Counsel‟s cross-petition for enforcement 
as moot.  
 
 On remand, a three-member panel of the Board 
affirmed the ALJ‟s May 20, 2008, rulings, findings, and 
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conclusions, and adopted the ALJ‟s recommended order.  355 
N.L.R.B. No. 81 (2010).  
 
 General Counsel again applies to this Court  for 
enforcement of the Board‟s order, and St. George cross-
petitions this Court for review of same. 
 
II. 
 
 The Board had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 
160(a)-(c).   We have jurisdiction over the Board‟s final order 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (f). 
   
 On appeal from a Board order awarding backpay, the 
Board‟s findings of fact “will be upheld unless the record, 
considered as a whole, shows no substantial evidence to 
support those findings.” Atl. Limousine, Inc., v. NLRB, 243 
F.3d 711, 715 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 88 Transit Lines, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 55 F.3d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Substantial 
evidence means “evidence that a reasonable mind would 
accept as adequate to support an agency‟s conclusion.”  Id. at 
718 (citation omitted). 
 
   The Board‟s determinations on questions of law are 
subject to plenary review, but with “due deference to the 
Board‟s expertise in labor matters.”  Id. at 715 (citing 88 
Transit, 55 F.3d at 825).  A backpay order will not be 
disturbed “„unless it can be shown that the order is a patent 
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be 
said to effectuate the policies of the Act.‟”  88 Transit, 55 
F.3d at 825 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 
379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)). 
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 The ALJ‟s credibility determinations, which the Board 
here affirmed, “„should not be reversed unless inherently 
incredible or patently unreasonable.‟”  Atl. Limousine, 243 
F.3d at 718-19 (quoting NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 
1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
 When the Board determines that an employee has been 
subjected to an unfair labor practice, it has broad discretion to 
fashion a back pay order that effectuates the policies 
underlying the NLRA.  Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 215 (citing  29 
U.S.C. § 160(c)).  Requiring an employer to make the 
employee whole through back pay serves “a two-fold 
objective”: (1) “the back pay reimburses the innocent 
employee for the actual losses which he has suffered as a 
direct result of the employer‟s improper conduct,” and (2) it 
“furthers the public interest advanced by the deterrence of 
such illegal acts.”  NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 
1307, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 
B. 
 
 St. George challenges the backpay award to Sides, 
arguing that: 1) based on the evidence produced by General 
Counsel, Sides‟s search for employment did not meet the 
reasonable diligence standard; and 2) Sides‟s backpay should 
be tolled for the periods in which he did not apply for jobs.  
Therefore, St. George asserts, the backpay it has already 
given Sides fully discharged its duty to make Sides whole. 
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 St .George argues that a discriminatee‟s singular 
reliance on unemployment office referrals is insufficient to 
satisfy the reasonable diligence standard.  See NLRB v. 
Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); 
NLRB v. Puch & Barr, Inc., 207 F.2d 409, 10 (4th Cir. 1953).  
However, it is well-established in Board case law that 
“[r]egistration with a state unemployment office is prima 
facie evidence of a reasonable search for employment.” 
Church Homes, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 829, 834 (2007); see also, 
e.g., Allegheny Graphics, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1145 
(1996), enforced, 113 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 1997);  Firestone 
Synthetic Fibers, 207 N.L.R.B. 810, 812 (1973); accord 
NLRB v. Midwestern Personnel Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 418, 
424 (7th Cir. 2007).  Sides‟s registration with the New Jersey 
unemployment office therefore reflects favorably on his 
efforts to mitigate.  
 
 Moreover, by suggesting that Sides‟s search was 
limited to job referrals from the unemployment office, St. 
George understates the extent of Sides‟s efforts to find 
interim employment.  Sides testified that, in addition to 
visiting the unemployment office approximately each week 
from May 1999 to September 1999, he consulted job listings 
in the newspaper at least every weekend, visited employers, 
and asked friends to inquire about job openings on his behalf; 
he independently applied for two openings he had found in 
the newspaper between March 1999 and October 1999; he 
registered with the NJDOL and, as LoSauro testified, was 
“very active” in soliciting that office‟s assistance in procuring 
new employment; and he became certified as a forklift 
operator in September 1999  to enhance his marketable skills.  
Those combined efforts are consistent with reasonable 
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diligence.  See, e.g., Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 425-
26 (holding that employee who put name on union‟s looking-
for-work list, searched for work through friends, reviewed 
want ads in local newspaper, and submitted one application 
on his own before obtaining referral through union had 
conducted reasonable search); Canova v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 
1498, 1506 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that workers who placed 
their names with state unemployment office and on union out-
of-work list, visited and applied to local employers, and 
looked through newspaper ads had diligently sought interim 
employment). 
 
 Furthermore, from October 1999 to May 2000, Sides 
found employment with two temporary staffing agencies: 
Labor Ready, from October 25, 1999, to November 26, 1999, 
and J & J, from November or December 1999 to March 12, 
2000.  Even while working for J & J, Sides applied for long-
term jobs with eight other employers, which speaks to the 
sincerity of his search.  See Allegheny Graphics, 320 
N.L.R.B. at 1145 (concluding that efforts of discriminatee, 
who “applied for unemployment benefits, sought permanent 
employment, and continued to seek such employment even 
after he was hired by a temporary agency,” were reasonable, 
as distinct from discriminatee who did not file for 
unemployment and only sought temporary positions).  After 
his job through J & J expired, Sides applied to thirteen 
positions over the next four-and-a-half months, and received a 
job offer in August 2000 to begin working in September 
2000.   Sides‟s procurement of temporary work, his continued 
search for permanent work even while employed temporarily, 
and his subsequent efforts to find a job once his temporary 
positions expired evince a reasonably diligent effort to locate 
employment.  See Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 425 
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(concluding that employee who applied to eight employers 
during six-month period, and found temporary work with one, 
exercised reasonable diligence during that period). 
 
 St. George also argues that Sides unduly circumscribed 
the scope of his search to a limited geographic area.  But the 
fact that Sides only considered applying to jobs within 
twenty-five miles from his home -- the same distance that St. 
George had been -- and within a mile from public 
transportation does not render his search any less reasonable.  
See, e.g., NLRB v. Westin Hotel, 758 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (determining employee acted reasonably in 
choosing not to apply for available positions twenty-five 
miles away from home because she did not have adequate 
transportation); Church Homes, 349 N.L.R.B. at 833 n.9 
(“Discriminatees are not required to accept employment 
where they would encounter transportation difficulties due to 
the location of the employment opportunity.”); Am. Bottling 
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1304 n.5 (1956) (concluding 
discriminatees acted reasonably by declining to seek jobs in 
area “at least from 9 to 30 miles” from their former 
employment, in light of “burdensome transportation 
problems” it would pose).  Inasmuch as “an employee need 
not seek employment „which involves conditions that are 
substantially more onerous than [her] previous position,‟” 
Sides was not obligated to look for jobs substantially further 
than St. George was from his home.  Donlin v. Philips 
Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Madison Courier, 472 F.2d at 1320-21).   
 
 Finally, St. George asserts that, at a minimum, Sides‟s 
backpay should be tolled for several periods -- some two- and 
three-weeks long -- during which he did not submit any 
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applications.  However, St. George improperly asks this court 
to view certain periods of inactivity in a vacuum rather than 
scrutinize Sides‟s efforts holistically.  The demand for 
reasonable diligence does not necessarily oblige a 
discriminatee to undertake a daily search for employment; 
rather, “„[t]he sufficiency of a discriminatee‟s efforts to 
mitigate back-pay are determined with respect to the back-
pay period as a whole and not based on isolated portions of 
the back-pay period.‟”  Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 
425 (quoting Local 3, IBEW, 315 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1266 
(1995)); accord Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., USA v. NLRB, 
850 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1988).   
 
 Taken as a whole, Sides‟s registration with two 
government agencies, his frequent searches for job openings 
through friends and newspaper listings, his submission of 
applications to thirty-three employers, and his procurement of 
two temporary positions, demonstrate Sides‟s “„honest good 
faith effort‟ . . . consistent with the inclination to work and to 
be self-supporting,” which satisfies us as reasonable 
diligence.  Kawasaki, 850 F.2d at 527 (citation omitted).   We 
find substantial evidence to support the Board‟s conclusion 
that General Counsel satisfied its burden of production with 
respect to Sides‟s efforts to mitigate. 
 
C. 
 
 In its objections to Tharp‟s backpay award, St. George 
primarily faults the Board‟s acceptance of Moskus‟s 
testimony, which St. George alleges consisted exclusively of 
inadmissible hearsay. Moskus‟s testimony was the only 
evidence that General Counsel produced of Tharp‟s job 
search in Florida.  That testimony was also significant for 
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expatiating on Tharp‟s earlier pursuit of employment in New 
Jersey. 
 
 Section 10(b) of the NLRA, as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
160(b),  provides that Board proceedings “shall, so far as 
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of 
evidence applicable in the district courts of the United 
States.”  Based on that provision, some courts have concluded 
that even if a discriminatee is unavailable to testify in a Board 
proceeding by reason of death, his extra-judicial statements 
are inadmissible hearsay.  See NLRB v. United Sanitation 
Serv., 737 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1984); Cent. Freight 
Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026  (5th Cir. 1981).  
 
 However, we have recognized the Board‟s power to 
construe  the rules of evidence liberally.  In NLRB v. Louton, 
Inc., we held that “[t]he conduct of a backpay proceeding and 
the application of the evidentiary rules lie within the 
discretion of the administrative judge,” and, moreover, “the 
party claiming injury from the alleged error must show that it 
suffered prejudice as a result of the ruling, in order for the 
Board‟s order to be reversed.”  822 F.2d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 
1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also, e.g., Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60, 
66 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that since “the Board is not 
required to observe automatically all the rules of evidence 
governing the trial of cases in court,” it was entitled to create 
a new evidentiary rule); NLRB v. W. B. Jones Lumber Co., 
245 F.2d 388, 392 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that “[t]he Board 
is not required to observe the legal rules of evidence as are 
common law courts,” and thus, “the evidence offered was 
admissible even though it may have involved hearsay”).  The 
appropriate inquiry “is whether the relaxation of the Federal 
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Rules of Evidence by the administrative law judge was 
reasonable under the circumstances and limited in its 
application to the practicalities of th[e] situation.”   Conley v. 
NLRB, 520 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming decision 
to admit witness‟s extra-judicial affidavits, even though they 
partially contradicted witness‟s testimony and consisted of 
hearsay, in order to ensure important evidence was not 
suppressed). 
 
 The evidentiary issues posed here mirror those 
addressed by the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Mastro Plastics 
Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).  In Mastro, the relatives 
of two deceased discriminatees had testified as to the 
discriminatees‟ diligent searches for work.  The Second 
Circuit held that such testimony was properly admitted: 
 
 Even if the testimony here 
received would be inadmissible 
hearsay in a civil action, we are 
not prepared to require the Board 
to exclude it from a back pay 
hearing.  As the discriminatee 
could not be produced, the Board 
could accept other evidence which 
tended to establish the facts.  
Here, the evidence was testimony 
as to the deceased‟s discussions of 
his search for alternative work.  
We do not consider it 
„practicable,‟ as that word is used 
in Section 10(b), to exclude this 
relevant testimony.  Moreover, 
since the burden of proving lack 
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of a diligent search was on [the 
employer], we fail to see how the 
admission of this testimony was 
prejudicial. . . . [T]he Board can 
only be expected to make 
available for the employer‟s 
cross-examination such evidence 
as it may reasonably obtain.   
 
Mastro, 354 F.2d at 179.   
 
 We conclude that the Board‟s affirmance of the ALJ‟s 
decision to allow Moskus to testify, given that it was the best 
evidence available, was not improper.  Prior to the Board‟s 
September 30, 2007, decision, the prevailing rule in Board 
proceedings was that the burden of production never shifted 
to General Counsel, who thus had no reason to collect or 
preserve evidence related to mitigation.  However, when the 
Board imposed on General Counsel a new duty to produce 
evidence, it placed General Counsel in an especially 
untenable position, since the ALJ‟s initial decision was issued 
about five years earlier, and the backpay sought covered a 
period spanning from 1999 to 2000.   
 
 By September 2007, most of the evidence that would 
have corroborated, or been more facially reliable than, 
Moskus‟s testimony was unavailable.  Indeed, Tharp had died 
in the five-year interim, and thus, General Counsel could not 
produce the most obvious evidence of his search, i.e., Tharp‟s 
testimony.  We agree with the ALJ‟s ruling that it would not 
“be appropriate or fair to the innocent, unlawfully discharged 
employee to require, in the circumstances of this unique case, 
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more specific evidence of Tharp‟s search for work than has 
already been provided.”  (A8.) 
 
 Lastly, St. George argues that General Counsel failed 
to carry its burden of showing that Tharp exercised 
reasonable diligence in seeking interim employment in either 
New Jersey or Florida. 
 
 General Counsel produced evidence that Tharp filed 
for employment benefits the day after he was discharged, and 
had certified on his application that he was “ready, willing 
and able” to accept long-term work.  On a Board backpay 
questionnaire, Tharp listed seven New Jersey employers to 
whom he had applied in the span of five days.  Both Moskus 
and Sarro testified that when Tharp‟s search in New Jersey 
proved unsuccessful, he moved to Florida in the hopes of 
finding more job opportunities.  Two weeks after he arrived 
in Florida in September 1999,  he began scanning newspaper 
listings, submitting applications, and visiting employers.  He 
obtained a job with Naples Lumber the following month, in 
mid-October 1999, which he held through the end of the 
backpay period.   
 
 We agree that substantial evidence was adduced from 
which the Board could conclude that General Counsel met its 
burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of Tharp‟s job 
search.  As discussed above, the act of registering with the 
unemployment office is prima facie evidence of reasonable 
diligence.  E.g., Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 424; 
Church Homes, 349 N.L.R.B. at 834.  The NLRB backpay 
questionnaire -- the only obtainable documentation of his 
search -- indicates that Tharp submitted seven applications 
over five days, and Moskus‟s testimony corroborated his 
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diligence throughout.  Given the unique evidentiary 
difficulties presented in this case, General Counsel‟s inability 
to obtain and produce further documentation should not 
defeat Tharp‟s entitlement to backpay.  See, e.g., Rainbow 
Coaches, 280 N.L.R.B. 166, 179 (1986), enforced, 835 F.2d 
1436 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Claimants are not disqualified from 
receiving backpay solely because of poor recordkeeping or 
uncertain memories.”).  Moreover, it is significant that Tharp 
relocated to a different state to find a job, and successfully 
obtained one in about a month‟s time.  See Midwestern 
Personnel, 508 F.3d at 423-24 (listing fact that discriminatee 
accepted job that “required prolonged periods away from 
home” as probative of reasonable search).  Cumulatively, that 
evidence was enough to demonstrate Tharp‟s reasonable 
efforts to attain interim employment.   
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was 
substantial evidence in the record from which the Board could 
conclude that both Sides and Tharp exercised reasonable 
diligence in searching for work following their illegal 
discharge from St. George.  Accordingly, we will affirm and 
enforce the order awarding backpay in the amounts of 
$26,447.90 to Sides and $14,649.79 to Tharp‟s estate. 
